David T. Faughn graduated with honors from the University of Kentucky College of Law in 1993. David was an Associate Editor of the Kentucky Law Journal and was elected to Order of the Coif. Prior to joining Miller, Griffin & Marks, David served as staff attorney for Judge Mary Noble, presently the Chief Judge of the Fayette Circuit Court and as law clerk for Judge Jennifer Coffman, United States District Court Judge, for the Eastern and Western Districts of Kentucky. David joined the firm in 1998, and concentrates his practice in the area of civil litigation. He is licensed to practice in Kentucky and California.
Higgins v. BAC Home Loans, Servicing, LP et al., 14-6167/6168 USCA 6th Cir
Doc 48-2USDC USCA 6th Circuit Opinion entered July 15, 2015.
Doc 73, Opinion and Order. USDC EDKy regarding US Bank, March 31, 2014.
Doc 74, Opinion and Order. USDC EDKy regarding FNMA FHFA, March 31, 2014.
Doc 75, Opinion and Order. USDC EDKy regarding BOA et al , March 31, 2014.Litigation Transactional Law
Baptist Physicians Lexington, Inc. v. The New Lexington Clinic, PSC, 2012-SC-242 (December 19, 2013)
The Kentucky Supreme Court clarified that the corporate fiduciary duty statute defined the duties of a director when acting in his official capacity on behalf of the corporation, but did not displace fiduciary duties when he was acting in his individual capacity and not in a corporate one. Thus, common law fiduciary duties survived enactment of statutes defining duties owed when acting on behalf of the corporation.
Fiduciary duties/corporations/ board member/officer/KRS 271B.8-300/pleadingLitigation Transactional Law Employment Law
Norton et al v. Perry et al., COA 2011-CA-2343/2394, Fayette Circuit 08-CI-6061 (2013)
Property owners in Fayette and Clark Counties in Kentucky learned of an effort to “nominate” their property to be listed on the National Historic Registry run by the National Park Service. The properties involved totaled well over 10,000 acres and would be designated as a National Historic District. Several property owners requested for their property to be removed from the effort. Those individuals pushing for the listing refused. The objectors then presented official objections to the nomination as the applicable federal regulations set forth. As the objectors learned, once the process of the nomination is started — and it only takes one person to start the process — it may be impossible to stop it as the federal rules have been written to essentially make stopping the process an impossibility. The objectors totaled more than 50% of the landowners by number and totally much more than 50% by acreage owned. Yet the movants continued to press forward with the guidance and assistance of employees in the Kentucky Historical Council under the Department of Tourism. The objectors filed an action in the trial court to stop the process. The Court provided little assistance in stopping the process but ultimately found that and ruled that the process followed by the movants using the federal regulations was flawed and arbitrary. On appeal to the Kentucky Court of Appeals, a 34 page published Opinion sets forth that the effort of the movants violated the property owners’ due process rights and that the property owners have a consitutional right to be left alone. The movants sought discretionary review by the Kentucky Supreme Court which was denied. This ruling is significant because it makes clear that the process to nominate real property to be listed on the National Historic Registry violates the due process rights of the property owner citizens of Kentucky and is arbitrary.Litigation Transactional Law
Use of Repositories: A Buyer’s Perspective
Highland Stud International, et al. v. Baffert, et al., 00-261-JMH (EDKy 2002)
The former purchaser of the “breeding rights” to Kentucky Derby winner REAL QUIET purchased his “racing qualities” in 2000. The 2000 agreement provided that the horse was sold “as is” and with no representation or warranties concerning the physical condition of the colt. The purchaser later sued the seller, trainer, and a veterinarian asserting various claims, including breach of contract and fraud, after REAL QUIET manifested a tendon injury after his arrival in Kentucky. The Court held that the purchaser could not assert “tort claims” such as fraud, under the “economic loss doctrine.” That doctrine provides that in sales governed by the UCC and involving purely economic losses as opposed to personal injuries, a party is bound by the contract and generally is limited to only contract claims. The Court also held that there was no breach of contract and dismissing the purchaser’s claims in this horse sales case under the “economic loss doctrine.”Equine Law Litigation
Expert Valuation Testimony in Equine Cases (Getting Your Horse (Expert) through the Gate)